Cameroon Armed Forces

Vistas of a House Divided
The divisions within the army might have mitigated the possibility of a military take-over, but the explosive potentialities of an army divided on ethnic and tribal lines cannot be underestimated. 
By Ekinneh Agbaw-Ebai, editor-at-large
Some stories are best told straight, so the hiatus of the propaganda and defensive infantile homilies hop scotched by President Paul Biya and his apostates during celebrations marking 50 years of the armed forces were anything but convincing. Whether out of choice or infirmity, “Cameroon Army and the Nation: 50 Years of Exemplary Service” seems to have been a noble theme for the event, but what the army has demonstrated these past 50 years is anything but exemplary.
    The highly choreographed event in 2010 in Bamenda was poorly constructed, logically flawed and indeed misleading. As Commander-in-chief, Biya failed to address the key issues bedeviling the armed forces beyond announcing cosmetic reforms that were just token measures of appeasement to an army that he has divided and factionalized on ethnic and tribal lines and lacking in sense of national purpose. Looking like a champion boxer determined to defend his title; Biya boasted sarcastically that, in the defence of republican institutions, the army has always done its “duty” and only “its duty” to the nation. It was a telling reminder, if at all any was needed, of the impervious role the army has played in circumventing democracy in Cameroon; having been reduced to an uncircumcised appendage of Biya’s ruling CPDM party.

    Let it be placed on record that the security responsibilities of the Cameroonian armed forces are monumental. For an institution that cut its teeth in the early years of independence dealing with the UPC uprising, the army has remained an instrument of oppression against the same citizens it was supposed to protect. The army has been called upon to quell the pro-democracy movement and has been the main reason why the CPDM government continues to hang unto power despite the fact that the party has been severely beaten at elections.
    To a man with a hammer, Mark Twain once said, everything looks like a nail. Biya has succeeded in emasculating the army through a system of patronage and ethnic-inspired clientelism. Although Biya has used the army to consolidate his power, owing to the absence of popular legitimacy, the President has consistently displayed a disdain for the traditional army, preferring “special units” that defend and project his power. The system of divide and conquer has left the army top brass entangled in the shady world of dubious business. Most of the Generals have been accorded juicy timber and mineral exploitation concessions; some head private security outfits, while the rank and file have resorted to racketeering and other criminal activities, including highway robbery. The divisions within the army might have mitigated the possibility of a military take-over, but the explosive potentialities of an army divided on ethnic and tribal lines cannot be underestimated.
    But for the Bakassi conflict that erupted in 1993, the Cameroonian army has nothing to write home about in terms of its principal function of defending the territorial integrity of the nation. Former President Ahmadou Ahidjo created the system where he controlled the army under his belt. From 1973 to 1982 when Ahidjo left power, the Cameroonian army had only one General, Pierre Semengue. Today, the army counts almost 30 Generals, most of them aged 65 years plus - far above the retirement age. Like Ahidjo, Biya has ensured that the Defence Ministry like other strategic positions within the army is occupied by tribesmen and loyalists. Under Ahidjo, military training centers were confined in remote areas in the North and West of the country, far from the seat of political power in Yaoundé.
    The April 6, 1984 coup attempt was the defining moment for Biya to rupture with the army. After purging the army and disbanding the Republican Guard of the gendarmerie, Biya created the Presidential Guard and moved to place his henchmen in strategic areas of the military offering promotions and financial incentives to his supporters, while laying the foundations to tribalize and fragment the army. The army was the only group of public servants whose salaries were not touched during the massive salary cuts in 1993 and 1994.
    One by-product of clientelism is the creation of a bourgeoisie class within the military. Generals who are overdue retirement are more interested in protecting their rent-seeking positions and privileges, hence the army to them, is just a means to an end. The army mantra of “honor and loyalty” has been thrown to the dogs. Since independence in 1960, no army General has gone on retirement; only Colonels do! This situation remains a major source of friction within the army, as the Generals not only enjoy undue privileges from the regime, they tend to block the promotion of Colonels, who are forced to end their respective careers without attaining the pinnacle of their profession; i.e. becoming a General.
    These simmering tensions are exacerbated by problems between young cadet officers and the old guard. The 2001 army reforms saw many younger and better educated officers joining the ranks of the army. These young Turks, most of them brandishing university degrees are frustrated by the status quo, and are poised to challenge the vested interests within the army. To this could be added the arbitrary nature of promotions within the military which favors officers from Biya’s Beti tribe. The lingering ghost of the 1984 coup has never been completely exorcised as soldiers from the northern parts of the country feel they were victimized, and punished while others who defended the regime felt betrayed that they were not adequately compensated because they belonged to the wrong tribe.
    The President himself is known to harbor strong feelings against the mainstream army, which he treats with disdain and suspicion. Because of their poor training, lack of equipment and an errant compensation system, morale amongst the rank and file has been low. To which end, Biya has resorted to creating specialized units which have become a veritable army within the army. The Presidential Guards; the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) are directly responsible to the president and neither to the Defence Minister nor the military hierarchy. Until his recent death in a military helicopter crash, the BIR and the Presidential Guards were under the command of a retired Israeli Lt Colonel Abraham Avi Sirvan; former Defence attaché at the Israeli embassy in Yaoundé, and the de facto security adviser of the president. These units are well trained, better equipped and earn better pay with better working conditions than the traditional army. And since there are not enough military barracks to house the army, it is common to find soldiers residing amongst civilians.