Inadequate logistics may mar war on Boko Haram

-War expert
By Numh Rogers in Yaounde
President Biya is leaving nothing to chance in the war on Boko Haram. Experts have affirmed that only an elite force could face the jihadists, because of the atypical blend of guerrilla warfare and terrorism carried out by the terrorists. It has emerged based on the Nigerian example that the massive deployment of troops against Boko Haram may not yield the desired fruits (Nigeria boasts of one of the strongest armies on the continent).
    Military experts point out that only a special, well adapted force capable of independent operations that can last from a few hours to weeks could be efficient in the war on Boko Haram. According to NATO, small, highly effective units can counter adversaries of far greater numbers, by reverting to diverse techniques and tactics, and preying on the weaknesses of the enemy.

    Consequently, Biya has instructed the minister of defence to set up a special squad to fight Boko Haram. The squad will be made up of at least a thousand men. Apparently, this should be an easy task. Many suggest that it suffices to pick out elements from special corps like the BIR, BTAP, GIPN and GP to set up one. But NATO experts debunk this idea, saying that a unit should not be tagged special just because it could carryout warfare in more than one situation. By NATO’s rating an elite squad should number between 200 to 500 men at the most. The BIR in Cameroon counts over 5000 men and so does not fall in NATO’s criteria for an elite force.

Lessons from Nigeria
    Jeune Afrique’s Laurent Touchard, an authority on defence issues in Africa points out for example that Nigeria’s Joint Task Force falls short of a special unit. Created in 2011, the Joint Task Force draws its elements from regular corps like the infantry, the air-force, the marine, the mobile police and the state security service. It is supposed to coordinate the efforts of constituent corps in the fight against Boko Haram.
    But the Joint Task Force had existed before Boko Haram, and had been deployed to Bakassi in 1996 and to the Niger Delta in 2009. Recently, it operates in the states of Bomo, Yobe and Plateau, while there is a special Task Force in Maiduguri.
    Touchard points out that despite their intimidating fatigues and sophisticated weaponry, the joint task force lacks the efficiency of a special force. Until 14 January, this lack of efficiency (largely due to want of aircraft) has crippled the force in their operations against Boko Haram.
    A top military authority in Cameroon holds that Cameroon does not boast any elite unit. “This is due more to lack of logistics than incompetence. “Our helicopters are mere transport vehicles; meanwhile an elite force needs swifter and stronger aircraft,” he regrets. We also need state-of-the-art communication tools to set up an elite force, he adds.
    Another officer holds the same view, arguing that the BIR, which is the nearest thing to an elite unit in Cameroon, is too large to be called one. An elite unit, he says, is made up of between 200 and 500 men, whose service in the force lasts for at most five years.