Fighting Boko Haram:

Confusion, cacophony at the war front
- Knowledgeable observers note that there are too many operational commands with all of them headed by generals; no one knows who has the final say 
Many cooks spoil the broth, so says the English adage. And this is just what is happening in the on going war against the dreaded Nigerian Islamist terrorist group, Boko Haram. Very knowledgeable observers say there are too many command posts and an unusual number of commanding generals in the war, to the extent that confusion and cacophony now reign at the battle fronts.
    The observers also note that the situation is not made good by the retro-tactics of the Islamist terrorists, who keep changing their strategies and modus operandi by the day: alternating intermittently from sporadic, surprise raids to Kamikaze bombardments, apart from the scotched-earth policy (planting land mines) that they at times revert to.
    Then as if these are not enough, the inconclusively constituted Joint Multi-national Task Force – JMTF has only added to the existing confusion and entropy.
    The commissioning last week of General Bouba Dokreo as the commander of the first unit of the JMTF with base at Mora has only complicated matters at the war front. General Bouba’s installation brought to three the number of Generals now heading different operational commands in the Boko Haram war only in Cameroon. Before General Bouba, two other Generals were commanding the operations Alpha and Emergence 4 based in Maroua and Kousseri respectively. And there are no indications any of these two operation commands would be dismantled with the coming of the JMTF command post at Mora.
    Besides, Nigeria and Chad are yet to be clear about their intentions concerning the JMTF. So far only Cameroon of the five countries that are supposed to constitute the JMTF has given the exact size of its contribution to the force.
    Yet, even as Cameroon has said she would contribute 2450 soldiers to the JMTF, it is not immediately clear from which units the soldiers would be drawn.

    Also, pressmen are confused as to who they should consult for good information on the Boko Haram war. Many journalists remark that even though an officer in charge of communication has been appointed to the Etat-major of the JMTF in the person of Lt-Col. Hubert Claude Nguiamba (a Cameroonian), it is still the communication officer of the Cameroon Ministry of Defense, Col. Didier Badjeck who still provides information relating to the JMTF and Boko Haram.
    It is Col. Badjeck who has tried to clarify the worry of journalists as to how to JMTF would operate vis-à-vis the national forces – Operation Alpha and Emergence 4. The Colonel explained that the role of the JMTF is to give support (appui in French) to the Alpha and Emergence 4 commands, where ever and when ever need be.
    “True, the JMTF is a mixed force with military chiefs from each of the contributing countries. But there would be no problem of coordination of actions, neither would there be a problem of integration of the soldiers on the field,” Col. Badjeck assured, noting that this may be difficult to comprehend by civilians but it is not a problem for the army because they are trained.
    Then there is the worry as to how Chadian soldiers would be distributed among the three units of the JMTF. The three bases include Mora in Cameroon and Gambourou and Baga in Nigeria. This worry is all the more because Nigeria has said she would not accept foreign soldiers entering and fighting Boko Haram within its territory.
    To make sure this does not happen, Nigeria has ensured that the UN Security Council takes no resolution on Boko Haram.
But this stance by Nigeria poses a serious problem, as it is improbable the five countries can on their own readily cough out the over 50bn needed to get the JMTF really operational.
    Yet another worry is the number of troops to be contributed by each of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin. Even though it was announced that the JMTF would comprise 8700 men, RFI has reported that a total of 11.150 soldiers may eventually be deployed, distributed as follows: Nigeria-3750 men, Chad-3000 men, Cameroon 2650 men, Niger – 1000 men and Benin – 750 men.